It can be considered as a means of combating the interference caused by this derogation only, under Article LAW. SURR 83(3), where a State has refused to execute an arrest warrant under the nationality exemption, the State shall consider initiating proceedings against its own national appropriate to the subject of the arrest warrant, taking into account the opinion of the issuing State. In cases where a judicial authority decides not to initiate such proceedings, the victim of the offence on which the arrest warrant is based may receive information on the decision in accordance with the applicable national law. MP Foster told the committee that they were “glad we tried to find a way to get justice.”[19] Jones told the committee that “this agreement goes beyond the capitulation agreements between the EU and Norway or Iceland. It requires the Member State to refer the matter to its own law enforcement authorities and provides for conditional surrender so that a country can extradite its own nationals to the United Kingdom so that they can be brought to justice and then returned to that country to serve their sentence. This is also seen as an obligation for the executing State to apply the principle “aut dedere aut judicare” (extradite or prosecute) if it refuses to surrender its own nationals. It remains to be seen whether this will work in practice or “is likely to paralyse the objectives of the CCA”. [20] The ECJ examined the legal basis of the Withdrawal Agreement and the ACC and ruled that the provisions of both Treaties are binding on Ireland. First, as regards the Withdrawal Agreement, the ECJ stated that the conclusion of the Withdrawal Agreement by the EU was based exclusively on Article 50(2) TEU and that, therefore, Protocol 21 was not applicable. Therefore, the ECJ concluded that under the Withdrawal Agreement, EU law, including the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant, will apply to the United Kingdom during the transition period. Second, as regards CTA, the CJEU stated that CTA`s legal basis was exclusively Article 217 TFEU and that, consequently, Protocol 21 did not apply. The ECJ concluded that Article 217 TFEU empowers the EU to include provisions, including those relating to the AFSJ, in the CCA and that these provisions are binding on Ireland. The new surrender mechanism will also revive the requirement of “dual criminality”, meaning that in both jurisdictions there must be a criminal offence before an extradition request can be granted. Member States may choose to derogate from the requirement of dual criminality; So far, however, only Spain, Slovenia, Lithuania, Romania and, in some circumstances, Poland have opted for this option.
Second, unlike the Framework Decision and, to a lesser extent, the Iceland-Norway Agreement, Part 3 of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement does not mention `mutual trust` or `mutual trust` in each other`s legal systems. Although the principle of mutual trust is a defining feature of the mae system (cf.B. Konecny v District Court in Brno-Venkov [2019] 1 WLR per Lord Lloyd-Jones), the practical meaning of this change in tone is likely to be limited given the general presumption of good faith that applies to all close extradition partners of the United Kingdom (see Ahmad and Aswat v. United States Government [2006] EWHC 2927). This is particularly true in the light of Article LAW Gen 3 of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, which states that Part 3 is based on long-standing respect for democracy, the rule of law and the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals, in particular as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. and the importance of implementing the rights and freedoms of this Convention at the national level”. The MFA Framework Decision did not contain a specific exception for political offences that would allow extradition to be prohibited in cases where the conduct constituted a political offence[6]. However, the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision referred to in paragraph 12 mentions `political opinions` as one of the protected characteristics that may constitute an obstacle to extradition if there is reason to believe that the extradition request is motivated to prosecute or punish the person on account of his or her political beliefs[7].
It was noted that this exception “represents an important new safeguard, although it is invoked in very few cases”. [8] This is defined as crimes that have a “political character” and one possible scenario in which this would have been the case is the demand for surrender of some prominent Catalan nationalists who would probably have fallen under this reason. [9] The new surrender mechanism within the ATT has “revived the requirement of dual criminality, which means that there must be a criminal offence in both jurisdictions before an extradition request can be granted.” [1] Article LAW. The ATT`s SURR.81 states that the execution of the arrest warrant may be refused if . the act on which the arrest warrant is based does not constitute a criminal offence under the law of the executing State (but not with regard to taxes, duties, duties and currencies). However, this rule may be waived if the United Kingdom and the Member States notify the Technical Committee on Law Enforcement and Judicial Cooperation that the condition of dual criminality is not applied, provided that the offence is listed in the article of the Act. SURR.79, paragraph 5 (which is identical to the MFA Framework Decision) and that the offence in the issuing State be punishable by deprivation of liberty or imprisonment for a maximum of three years. can be punished.. .